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LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS AND THE MODERNIZED IRS: A VIEW FROM
THE TRENCHES
By Janet Spragens and Nancy Abramowitz
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I. Introduction
The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Re-
form Act of 19981 initiated a vast reorganization of the
IRS that is evolving even today as the Service continues
to streamline its processes of tax administration. In the
seven years since the restructuring act was passed, the
reorganization (sometimes referred to hereinafter as IRS
modernization) and the computer upgrade that accom-
panied it, have had a far-reaching effect on the way
taxpayers do business with the IRS.
In many ways, the changes in agency structure under
IRS modernization have generated significant efficiency
gains and advancements for the IRS and for taxpayers.
For many individual taxpayers whose returns are not
accepted as filed, however, the changes brought about by
the reorganization have almost uniformly made dealing
with the agency more difficult, impersonal, frustrating,
and costly. The changes have taken a particular toll on
low-income taxpayers, many of whom do not speak
English, are not connected to the Internet, and who do
not have ready access to much of the technology on
which IRS processes are often premised (for example,
Web sites, telecopy communications, and so forth). Those
taxpayers tend to be better helped through local walk-in
offices and opportunities to resolve their controversies in
face-to-face meetings rather than through an organiza-
tional structure based on geographically remote special-
ized campuses, computerized telephone trees with auto-
mated selections, computer-generated correspondence,
and electronic transfers.
For low-income taxpayers, the efficiency gains under
modernization, achieved by the IRS’s increasing reliance
on specialized offices and computer generated notices,
have often come at the expense of fairness. An interesting
outgrowth from the reorganization has been the regular-
ity with which low-income taxpayers have been falling
out of the regular administrative controversy resolution
processes, and their increasing dependence on alternative
‘‘back-door’’ problem-solving avenues to get to the right
result in their cases, after the case has been transferred to
collections. Those alternative processes include audit
reconsideration, offers-in-compromise (based on ‘‘doubt
as to liability’’), currently noncollectible (CNC) status,
collections due process (CDP) hearings, and hardship
appeals to the office of the National Taxpayer Advocate.
But a review of a case once it is in collections, even a
‘‘substantive issue’’ one, is not the same as receiving a fair
review during the initial audit of the case. Moreover, it is
not clear what will happen to those taxpayers once
section 6306 (involving outsourcing of debt collections)
becomes operational and their names are forwarded to
private debt collectors with limited information about (or
interest in) the correctness of the original return.
1Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (the restructuring
act).
Janet Spragens is the director and Nancy
Abramowitz is the supervising attorney of the Ameri-
can University Federal Tax Clinic in Washington.
This article examines the continuing effects on
low-income taxpayers of the 1998 Internal Revenue
Service reorganization and computer modernization
of the agency. Specifically, the article highlights the
severe hardships that have been experienced by that
segment of the taxpayer population resulting from
agency efforts to streamline resolution of postfiling
disputes. Those efforts include acceleration of the
administrative process, centralization of agency func-
tion, elimination of local contracts, and increasing
reliance on computer-generated correspondence. The
authors believe that the net result for many taxpayers
has been the trading of fairness for administrative
efficiency and the contraction — and often denial — of
taxpayer prepayment rights.
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The authors both teach in the American University
Federal Tax Clinic and supervise third-year law school
student-attorneys who represent low-income taxpayers
in controversy and collection matters with the IRS. From
that perspective, they have had front-row seats to see the
problems low-income taxpayers have been experiencing
in the IRS in recent years. Their observations — as well as
their suggestions for what the IRS can do to improve
service to those taxpayers — are the subject of this article.
II. The 1998 Reorganization
The 1998 IRS reorganization created four operating
divisions, each having ‘‘end-to-end’’ responsibility for
the needs of taxpayers within their jurisdictional group-
ings. That structure replaced a system based on local
offices with overlapping functions in 33 districts and 9
regions. The purpose of the reorganization was to bring
the agency’s methods of doing business into the 21st
century and to move the agency toward an interactive,
technologically advanced, and efficient system of tax
administration.
An integral part of the reorganization has been the
automation and computerization of many IRS functions,
as well as the centralization of many of those functions in
the campuses: For example, innocent spouse claims are
now worked exclusively at the Covington, Kentucky,
campus. Offers in compromise go to Brookhaven, N.Y.,
and Memphis. Docketed ‘‘S’’ cases are reviewed by
Appeals at the Philadelphia and Fresno campuses. EITC
certification,2 if instituted, will be handled in Kansas City.
The model that Congress and the Clinton administra-
tion used for the IRS reorganization to a large extent
relied on organizational principles that many large cor-
porations had employed in the prior decade to enhance
customer service. In the committee reports accompany-
ing the 1998 legislation, Congress expressed its view that
the public was not being properly served by an agency
focused solely on revenue collection.3 Congress’s intent
was to restructure the IRS’s priorities and put more
emphasis on taxpayer service.4 By grouping similarly
situated taxpayers together and focusing agency person-
nel on their needs, Congress also anticipated efficiency
gains as IRS employees developed expertise in particular
areas.5 The new structure, Congress believed, would not
only be more taxpayer friendly, it would also be more
streamlined and efficient, and it would better serve the
needs of accountability and continuity.6
Interestingly, the 1998 legislation also had as one of its
principal goals the enhancement of taxpayer rights in
dealing with the agency. Included in the legislation were
provisions for shifting the burden of proof from the
taxpayer to the government in the Tax Court in certain
cases,7 extending attorney-client privilege to accountants
and enrolled agents,8 expanding the IRS’s ability to
compromise taxpayer debts,9 and expanding innocent
spouse relief.10 The law also redesigned and enhanced
the responsibilities of the national taxpayer advocate,11
and created a matching grant program for tax clinics that
represented low-income taxpayers in controversies with
the agency.12
Under the reorganization, the movement toward cen-
tralization of functions at the campuses has been accom-
panied by reductions in the number of IRS walk-in
centers (now known as taxpayer assistance centers or
TACs), and reduced staffing and hours of operation at
those centers. TACs offer a variety of services to both
English-speaking and Spanish-speaking taxpayers, in-
cluding tax return preparation for taxpayers earning less
than $36,000 a year and agency employees who will
answer taxpayers’ questions about the law, explain IRS
letters and notices, and help taxpayers with collections
matters (for example, release of levies on wages, or
installment payment plans). TACs can also check on the
status of a refund or other adjustment to the taxpayer’s
tax account. Taxpayers need not make an appointment to
use TAC services or meet with a TAC employee. They can
simply go to the center, take a number, and wait their
turn. That is particularly appealing to seniors who may
have the luxury of time to wait for service and who may
not be Internet savvy, as well as to taxpayers with limited
English proficiency (LEP) who prefer to explain their
problem in person, to an individual behind a desk, rather
than over the phone in a language not native to them.
The IRS budget request for Fiscal 2006 proposed
almost a $39 million reduction for taxpayer service.13 Tax
Notes reported earlier this year that the IRS is currently
considering closing more than 100 TACs as a result of
budgetary pressure.14 That is roughly one-fourth of all
TACs. On June 6, Tax Notes reported that the Service has
decided to close 68 TACs.15
By some measures, the reorganization has fully deliv-
ered the efficiency and computer modernization gains it
was intended to produce. For example, more than 60
million taxpayers in the United States e-filed their tax
returns last year,16 resulting in faster processing, faster
2See section D below.
3S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 8 (1998); H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 194
(1998).
4H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 34 (1997); S. Rep. No.
105-174, at 8-9 (1998).
5H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 35 (1997); S. Rep. No.
105-174, at 12 (1998).
6H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 46 (1997); S. Rep. No.
105-174, at 9 (1998).
7Section 7491, added by restructuring act section 3001. Sec-
tion references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, except as otherwise noted.
8Section 7525, added by restructuring act.
9Section 7122, added by resructuring act.
10Section 6015, added by restructuring act.
11S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 23-24 (1998).
12Section 7526, added by restructuring act.
13Internal Revenue Service, ‘‘The Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year
2006,’’ Department of the Treasury, at 1 (February, 2005), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/bib_irs.pdf.
14Kenney, A., ‘‘Déjà Vu? Bush wants $500 Million for IRS to
Toughen Up in 2006,’’ Tax Notes, Feb. 14, 2005, p. 747.
15Kenney, A., ‘‘IRS Announces Plans to Close Taxpayer
Assistance Centers,’’ Tax Notes, June 6, 2005, p. 1219.
16Kenney, A. ‘‘Electronic Filing Reaches Record High in
2004,’’ Tax Notes, May 17, 2004, p. 790.
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refunds, direct deposit of refund checks, immediate veri-
fication of certain return information, and enormous
savings for the IRS in terms of putting taxpayer data into
the system. IRS forms, instruction booklets, notices, and
publications as well as other valuable information are all
now available for downloading from the IRS Web site —
a huge convenience. And with IRS electronic processing
significantly accelerating the payment of refunds, the
system reduces the attractiveness of high-interest refund
anticipation loans (RALs) and other short-term loan
products that erode the amounts received from the EITC
and otherwise prey on low-income taxpayers.17
Insofar as controversy resolution for low- and middle-
income taxpayers is concerned, however, the reorganiza-
tion has not enhanced taxpayer rights and service. In fact,
in our experience, the trend has been in the opposite
direction.
III. Taxpayer Rights Under IRS Modernization
A. The Postfiling Issues of Low-Income Taxpayers
As we have written about before,18 contrary to the
popular stereotype, low-income taxpayers do not all have
simple, audit-proof returns consisting essentially of wage
and salary income subject to wage withholding, and the
standard deduction. Many of those taxpayers claim the
earned income tax credit, which can be an economic
lifeline but also an audit magnet. Returns of low-income
wage earners also contain a variety of other items with
audit potential, such as the child credit, dependent care
credit, education credits, head of household filing status,
income from disability pensions, in-kind charitable con-
tributions, premature IRA distributions, and gambling
losses — to name a few.
Moreover, many low-income taxpayers are entrepre-
neurs with their own small businesses — for example, as
food service providers, taxi drivers, hairdressers, roofers,
merchants, child care providers, or carpet installers —
and, as a result, are required to file quarterly estimates of
tax, pay self-employment taxes, and claim business de-
ductions on schedule C. Often, those self-employed low-
income taxpayers have only the most rudimentary un-
derstanding about the recordkeeping necessary to meet
filing requirements or about the filing requirements
themselves.
A growing number of low-income taxpayers are lim-
ited english proficiency (LEP) taxpayers and face major
language barriers in understanding their tax obligations
and the avenues for challenging IRS disallowance of their
filing positions. Many of those taxpayers seek help with
their tax obligations from professional preparers, but
their inability to communicate in English often leads
them to seek out preparers who speak their language
without checking the preparer’s credentials or training in
taxation. The advice they get from those preparers can
range from excellent to incompetent to totally fraudulent.
If the taxpayers are undocumented workers, they may be
more likely to become embroiled in issues with the IRS
involving erroneous Social Security numbers or identity
theft.
Fair resolution of those cases has traditionally in-
volved cultural, communication, language, and other
barriers for the IRS that are different from those raised in
cases involving other taxpayers. In resolving those issues
successfully, an important part of the process has histori-
cally involved allowing the taxpayers the time and
opportunity to have a face-to-face meeting with IRS
employees. Taxpayers in that demographic tend not to
keep good records, and the face-to-face meetings afford
taxpayers an opportunity to tell their stories and for the
government to assess their credibility, ask them ques-
tions, and elicit facts that the taxpayers might not other-
wise know could be relevant. The opportunity for tax-
payers to describe their circumstances has been very
important in reaching correct resolutions, particularly
when the issues have involved family status, family
relationships, and living patterns (for example, the EITC,
filing status, dependency exemptions, and the child
credit) — issues that are often not amenable to proof by
cancelled checks and other financial records. Even the
communications to arrange the meetings added time,
focus, and deliberation to the process for involved tax-
payers, helping them to better understand what was
happening.
The need for individual attention and consideration of
taxpayer circumstances has also been very important
when offers in compromise based on ‘‘effective tax ad-
ministration,’’ or innocent spouse claims based on equi-
table grounds, have been involved. Those cases are not
easily routinized, because taxpayer circumstances are so
different.
B. Controversy Resolution Under Modernization
Increasingly, individual audits under modernization
are being conducted long distance via mail, including all
EITC audits. Those audits for the most part are based on
notices that are computer generated on the IRS cam-
puses. In the notices, the IRS requests that the taxpayer’s
information and supporting documents be mailed to the
campus officer working the case. When a taxpayer re-
sponds to the notice by submitting records and other
information, there is (based on our anecdotal experience
and the experiences of other clinics) very little reaching
out to or attempting to contact taxpayers who send in
partial responses to requests for information, or to those
who send in information that is not in the precise form
requested by the agency. The emphasis is on rapid case
processing with minimum resources expended — and
reduced discretion of IRS employees to accept alternative
forms of proof — to produce uniform results. That often
translates into the prompt issuance of a deficiency notice
shortly after the filing of a return, sometimes as quickly
17Berube, Kim, Forman, and Burns, ‘‘The Price of Paying
Taxes: How Tax Preparation and Refund Loan Fees Erode the
Benefits of the EITC,’’ The Brookings Institution and Progressive
Policy Institute Survey Series (May 2002).
18See Spragens and Abramowitz, ‘‘IRS Modernization and
Low-Income Taxpayers,’’ 53 Admin. L. Rev. 701 (2001); Spragens
and Olson, ‘‘Tax Clinics: The New Face of Legal Services,’’ Tax
Notes, Sept. 18, 2000, p. 1525; Spragens, ‘‘Welfare Reform and
Tax Counseling: Overlooked Part of the Welfare Debate,’’ Tax
Notes, Oct. 21, 1996, p. 353. See also Testimony of Janet Spragens
before the IRS Oversight Board, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, http://
www.treas.gov/irsob/meetings.
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as within six to eight months (or less) of the filing date.
The taxpayer is then required to file a petition in the Tax
Court to engage in a dialogue with anyone in an effort to
resolve the issue.19
Efficiency goals have also led the IRS to issue so-called
combination letters in all EITC audits. Those letters,
which the IRS has stated it will begin phasing out in 2006,
combine the traditional two-step examination/appeals
process in which an IRS examiner first asks the taxpayer
for documentation or other information to support a
claimed return position and then sends him proposed
adjustments in a ‘‘30-day letter’’ that allows the taxpayer
to request an administrative appeal. The ‘‘combination
letter,’’ which is the first correspondence to the taxpayer
regarding examination of the return, asks him to forward
the requested information or to request an administrative
appeal — all within 30 days of the date of the letter. If the
taxpayer does not reply within 30 days, or if the infor-
mation sent does not satisfy the IRS, the next letter the
taxpayer gets is a notice of deficiency. If the taxpayer then
does not file a Tax Court petition within 90 days of
receiving the deficiency notice, the tax is assessed and the
case is sent to Collections. In many cases that all occurs
before the taxpayer has a full understanding that the time
to contest the merits of the IRS’s position has expired.
Moreover, under modernization each tax year is pro-
cessed as a separate case, often by different campuses. A
common scenario we have seen as a result is taxpayers
throwing away the deficiency notice for the subsequent
year, believing it to be simply a copy of the notice for a
prior year. By doing so, the taxpayer loses the right to Tax
Court review of the disallowance, even though he may
believe that the benefit on the return was correctly
claimed and even though he has filed a petition in the Tax
Court to litigate the first year. The taxpayer must then
deal with collections (or audit reconsideration) for the
defaulted year while dealing with area counsel for the
primary year. Because the proof and issues will overlap
in those cases, and because the administrative file in the
case has been sent to counsel, the IRS representative
attempting to resolve the second year’s case will be
dealing for the most part with computer entries to obtain
knowledge about the taxpayer’s circumstances.20
Another trend we have been seeing in the last several
years has been the IRS’s increasing use of math error
authority, under section 6213, to process cases. Math error
authority historically has applied to cases in which the
tax return shows an obvious and clear error, for example,
when there is an addition, subtraction, multiplication, or
division error on the return; an omission of required
information; or an incorrect use of a tax table. Under
math error authority, the IRS can assess the additional tax
due without first allowing the taxpayer to exercise rights
under the more lengthy examination deficiency proce-
dures. Under math error procedures, the taxpayer has
only very limited time — as offered in less than a clear
notice — to challenge the math error determination
before the ‘‘error’’ is assessed.21
Under section 6213(g), enacted in 1976, Congress
authorized the IRS to use math error procedures in EITC
audits when data from the Federal Case Registry (FCR) is
inconsistent with the return. The FCR is a federally
maintained database, based on reports from state agen-
cies, that contains child support orders indicating the
parent with whom a child resides. That information is
used by the IRS to determine whether the taxpayer is the
custodial parent, a requirement for claiming the credit.
But information regarding child custody is not static and
unchanging as is, for example, birth date information
obtained by the IRS from the Social Security Administra-
tion. Taxpayers’ living and custody circumstances can
change frequently, making the FCR information out of
date.
A few examples illustrate some of the problems that
are occurring today in the modernized IRS:
Example 1: Assume a taxpayer receives a combination
letter challenging her entitlement to the earned income
tax credit and requesting documentation — for example,
school records, medical records, birth certificates — that
the taxpayer’s child was related to her and lived with her
for more than half of the year. The letter asks for a
response within 30 days, the information to be sent to one
of the IRS campuses remote to her. Assume further that it
takes some time for the taxpayer to collect the informa-
tion, but the taxpayer does so and sends it to the agency
on the 29th day. However, before the taxpayer’s informa-
tion is forwarded to the person working the case, the IRS
computer, which generated the original notice and has
been programmed to act on the 30th day, sends the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency by return mail. The
taxpayer is understandably confused because it is unclear
why the documentation has been turned down or
whether it even has been considered. However, because
the taxpayer has received a notice of deficiency, the
taxpayer must file a petition in the Tax Court within 90
days to keep the case open. Because the taxpayer thought
her timely submission took care of the problem, she does
not file in the Tax Court. Accordingly, the taxpayer, who
correctly claimed the credit, will be effectively denied any
substantive review of the proposed deficiency and the
case will show up in IRS statistics as a misclaim of the
credit.
Example 2: The second taxpayer receives the same
letter, but he responds on the 15th day. However, this
taxpayer, who is a recent immigrant to the United States,
cannot produce all the information the IRS has requested;
for example, he does not have a birth certificate for the
child who was born in Sierra Leone. However, the
taxpayer states that he is willing to testify or submit
19We have recently seen several taxpayers who were told by
the IRS early in the administrative process that if they didn’t
have the exact papers requested, ‘‘just wait for a 90-day letter, go
to Tax Court, and talk to IRS Area Counsel.’’ Not only is that
inefficient, but it also exacts a Tax Court filing fee as a toll charge
to speak to the IRS. It also may prolong the receipt of a claimed
refund by many months or more.
20This problem is not insignificant. We raised it in a letter to
the IRS some years ago, but the problem continues unabated.
See Spragens and Abramowitz, letter to Chief Counsel Stuart
Brown, Doc 1999-27217, 1999 TNT 160-20 (Aug. 16, 1999). 21Section 6213(b).
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affidavits (as are others) about the child. Without any
attempt to contact the taxpayer, the IRS denies the claim
and sends the taxpayer a notice of deficiency. The tax-
payer fails to understand the 90-day window for filing a
Tax Court petition, and he too winds up in collections,
even though the claim of the credit was accurate.
Example 3: The third taxpayer, after being sent a notice
of deficiency by the campus, files a timely petition in the
Tax Court and successfully defends his entitlement to the
credit. However, after decision documents are entered
and the taxpayer inquires when he will receive his
refund, he learns that he will not be receiving it at all,
because six months earlier he had received another notice
of deficiency — comparable to the one for the year before
the court except for an unremarkable notation in small
print in the upper right-hand corner that it was for the
year subsequent to the year in dispute. Thinking it was
simply a duplicate of the first notice, the taxpayer threw
it away and did not file a Tax Court petition for that year.
As a result, the second disputed year, which was entirely
separated from the IRS administrative file for the first
year and handled by another campus, was treated as
defaulted and sent to collections. The refund won in the
Tax Court will be used against the supposed deficiency
for the second year.
All of those cases are based on actual experiences at
our clinic, and those stories are being repeated all over
the country, as automated, centralized, and streamlined
processing of cases becomes more pervasive and tax-
payer opportunities to challenge IRS errors are reduced.
The above examples involve earned income tax credit
audits. But similar problems occur in other substantive
areas, such as the other child-based benefits of the code
(child credit, dependent care credit, head of household
filing status, and dependency exemptions), the education
credits, and Schedule A and C deductions, and are subject
to the same processing methods.
In her annual reports to Congress, National Taxpayer
Advocate Nina Olson is required to list the 20 most
serious problems facing taxpayers in their dealings with
the agency. In 2002 the number one problem she named
was the difficulty taxpayers have in navigating the
agency and finding the right person to talk to about their
particular issue.22 Also on the list were IRS procedures for
dealing with EITC claims, including combination letters
and unclear correspondence concerning appeal rights
(Problem 7); and lack of IRS response to taxpayer inquir-
ies during EITC audits (Problem 8).23 In 2003 the advo-
cate’s list of the 20 most serious problems repeated the
problem of navigating the IRS (Problem 9), and also
included combination letters (Problem 6), closing TACs
(Problem 11), and the expansion of math error authority
with inadequate explanations to taxpayers of their rights
under this procedure (Problem 8).24
In her 2004 report, the advocate’s list of the 20 most
serious problems included taxpayer access — reduction
in face-to-face interactions (Problem 2) and remote inter-
actions (Problem 3).25 The report also described a study
the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) had undertaken
involving 330 EITC audit reconsideration cases, for tax
years 2000 to 2003.26 On average, TAS case advocates
made five phone calls to the taxpayer who had requested
audit reconsideration, a significantly higher number than
is usually made by exam or the regular audit reconsid-
eration staff. The increase in phone contact had a signifi-
cant effect on case results. The study showed that with
the increased number of attempted contacts, an addi-
tional 43 percent of taxpayers in the study received some
or all of the credit that had been denied in the regular
audit processes.
C. Alternative Process Resolutions
The extreme compression of the audit process under
modernization, the computerization of follow-up notices,
and the inability to deal with the agency except through
difficult long-distance contacts, has, as noted above,
taken a particular toll on low-income taxpayers. Those
taxpayers often have a low or delayed reaction rate to
correspondence from the IRS. And when timelines are
expedited and there is no possibility of local resolution,
those taxpayers simply miss the deadlines for reply set by
the correspondence or fail to respond entirely. The IRS
then takes their nonresponses as a concession of their
cases.
A certain number of taxpayers caught up in those
scenarios will simply pay the bill or have it offset against
their future refunds, despite the fact that they do not owe
it. Those overpayments will never be recouped by those
taxpayers.
Other taxpayers to whom this occurs will belatedly
wake up and attempt to prove their cases. But their
recourse at that point is solely through remedies avail-
able once the case is in collections, such as audit recon-
sideration,27 CDP hearings, and OICs. And although
Congress significantly expanded those remedies in
1998,28 they remain, for the most part, remedies that are
limited and that often rely on the exercise of administra-
tive grace by an overburdened agency.
A 2001 Tax Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA) report on audit reconsideration recognized
problems in this type of controversy resolution. The
report stated:29
22National Taxpayer Advocate, 2002 Annual Report to Con-
gress, IRS Pub. No. 2104 (2002), at 7, http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-utl_2002_annual_rpt.pdf.
23Id. at 55, 64.
24Id. at 87, 122, 145 (2003).
25Id. at 8, 26 (2004).
26See supra note 18.
27Audit reconsideration is a process that permits taxpayers to
request reconsideration of an audited year and present informa-
tion not previously considered during the regular audit. Under
section 6404, the IRS has discretionary authority to abate
assessments or unpaid taxes that are deemed to be excessive.
28Restructuring act, supra note 1.
29Audit Reconsideration Cases Create Unnecessary Burden on
Taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service, TIGTA Report No.
2001-40-053 (March 2001), at 4-5, http://www.treas.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2001reports/200140053fr.html.
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Audit reconsideration cases create an unnecessary
burden on both the taxpayer and the Internal
Revenue Service. In FY 1999 alone, the IRS abated
audit assessments on the accounts of approxi-
mately 106,000 individual taxpayers through its
audit reconsideration process. This represents a
burden on taxpayers because it requires them to
address excessive tax assessments that should have
been resolved during the initial audit. The IRS is
also burdened by this rework because it must
redirect its current compliance resources away from
today’s compliance issues.
TIGTA noted that the high number of abatements in its
study ‘‘may indicate a problem with inappropriate audit
assessments.’’30 The 106,000 1999 abatements totaled
more than $711 million in taxpayer dollars.31
Moreover, during audit reconsideration, all taxpayer
refunds are frozen and applied against the supposed
deficiency. And if the issue involves an asserted misclaim
of the earned income tax credit, once the year has been
assessed, a ‘‘recertification indicator’’32 will be added to
the taxpayer’s account. Because those indicators are not
easily removed,33 resolving the case through a collections
remedy will be only one step in restoring the taxpayer’s
correct tax position. The taxpayer will have to engage in
further adversarial battles, perhaps with other audit
reconsideration offices on different campuses, to clear
other years affected by the erroneous denial of the
primary year.
The OIC program is also an imperfect substitute for
taxpayers who have missed having their cases adjudi-
cated in the regular controversy resolution processes.
Among other things, the high volume of offers has
created processing problems for the IRS and has resulted
in a focus on resolving offers quickly or treating them as
‘‘nonprocessable.’’ Our experience in that program in-
volves submitted offers that are rejected and sent back to
the taxpayer with no meaningful explanation of the
reasons for the rejection; delayed and additional process-
ing that results in requests for further (and more current)
financial information from the taxpayer; supplemental
material that is submitted being ignored; and taxpayers
being sent requests for additional information that has no
bearing on the offer being considered — such as a request
to a homeless and destitute taxpayer to confirm that he
has no ‘‘brokerage account information’’ — all to ‘‘pro-
cess’’ the case. Also, the extensive forms required for the
offer, which involve complicated financial submissions
and disclosures, do not give the taxpayer an opportunity
and place to ‘‘tell his story’’ — which we have found is a
very important part of a successful offer.
In a September 3, 2004, letter to Treasury Secretary
John Snow raising questions about the agency’s admin-
istration of the OIC program, including its high rejection
rate of offers as ‘‘nonprocessable,’’ Sens. Chuck Grassley,
R-Iowa, and Max Baucus, D-Mont., (the chair and rank-
ing minority member of the Senate Finance Committee,
respectively) wrote as follows:
We have heard from many practitioners and inter-
ested parties that the IRS is more interested in
managing OIC inventory rather than getting to a
resolution of tax debt and giving the taxpayers a
fresh start.
Apart from the processing issues, OICs do not grant
refunds to taxpayers who have been improperly denied
them, nor do they help taxpayers with the EITC recerti-
fication issue.
D. Problems in the Earned Income Tax Credit
The compression of audit process described above is a
theme that is being taken to a new level in the proposed
certification of the earned income tax credit that the IRS
is currently considering implementing for up to four
million low-income taxpayers each year. If that initiative
is implemented, some taxpayers claiming the earned
income tax credit (mostly fathers of qualifying children)
would be required to submit their supporting informa-
tion — and be subject to a preaudit of the credit — when
they file their tax return for the year. They would then be
immediately certified for the credit — or denied certifi-
cation, pending submission of more data. All EITC re-
funds would be withheld until the certification informa-
tion was accepted.
1. A short history of certification. The certification pro-
posal was developed because several IRS studies have
shown the EITC to have a high overclaim rate34 and the
Government Accountability Office has for several years
identified the EITC as a high-risk program and instructed
the IRS to develop methods of reducing the error rate in
the credit.35
In 2002 the IRS created a task force to examine ways of
better targeting the EITC to its intended beneficiaries,
30Id. at 2-3.
31Id. at 7.
32Under section 32(k), a taxpayer who has had the earned
income tax credit denied in an examination must prove eligibil-
ity for the credit before being able to claim it again. To
implement that rule, the IRS places a ‘‘recertification indicator’’
on the taxpayer’s account. The recertification indicator can be
removed only through a complicated ‘‘recertification’’ process.
According to a March 2005 TIGTA report, as of December 2003,
almost one million taxpayers had recertification indicators on
their accounts, and the recertification program was fraught with
problems. The Earned Income Credit Recertification Program Con-
tinues to Experience Problems, TIGTA Report No. 2005-40-036, Doc
2005-5395, 2005 TNT 50-19 (Mar. 11, 2005).
33Id.
34Under the most recent study, released in February 2002, the
IRS concluded that of the $31.3 billion in EITC claimed in 1999,
erroneous payments represented 27 percent to 31.7 percent of
total claims, or a total of between $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion. It
is not known what percent of the overclaims represent fraud
and what percent represent unintentional errors.
The most frequent source of errors was taxpayers claiming
children who did not meet the residency requirement of the
credit.
35GAO, Earned Income Tax Credit: Opportunities to Make Recer-
tification Program Less Confusing and More Consistent, GAO-02-
449 (April 25, 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do2449.
pdf. See also Book, ‘‘Noncompliance: What We Don’t Know Can
Hurt Them,’’ Tax Notes, June 23, 2003, p. 1821.
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reducing overclaims, but also maximizing eligible partici-
pation rates in the credit. (The IRS has estimated that
only about 75 percent of those entitled to the credit
actually claim it.)
Using recommendations of the task force, in 2003 the
IRS developed a proposal to require claimants of the
credit to ‘‘precertify’’ eligibility by submitting, in the
summer months preceding the close of the tax year,
documentation concerning the residency and relation-
ship requirements of the credit, both a frequent source of
errors. Under that plan, the precertification forms were
due on or before December 31 of the tax year. Precertifi-
cation was aimed at a maximum of about four million
taxpayers whose residency and relationship status with
their qualifying child was unable to be verified by the IRS
through other means. To implement that program, the
IRS’s 2004 budget request asked for a $100 million
appropriation for 650 new full-time equivalent employ-
ees. That budgetary request was in addition to about $145
million the IRS has spent each year since 1997 solely on
EITC compliance measures.
The task force’s precertification recommendation fol-
lowed earlier unsuccessful attempts to reduce the over-
claim rate, first by increasing the audit resources targeted
at EITC claimants,36 and second by adding to the law
extremely harsh penalties for misclaims of the credit.37
Currently, a taxpayer who erroneously claims the credit
is barred from claiming it again — even though he is
entitled to do so — for a 2- or 10-year period, the length
of time depending on whether the error was negligent or
fraudulent.38
To our knowledge, no other provision in the code has
its own enforcement appropriation line in the IRS budget.
Moreover, to our knowledge, there is no other penalty in
the code comparable to section 32(k), for any other type
of conduct. Also, once those penalties take effect, rein-
statement of eligibility to claim the credit is subject to a
complicated ‘‘recertification’’ process, that often is little
understood by taxpayers and involves the filing of forms
that are not automatically sent or available to taxpayers.
Moreover, a recertification application results in an auto-
matic audit of the reinstatement year.39
Despite those harsh enforcement strategies, the 2002
IRS study of the EITC remarkably showed no reduction
in overclaims.
The originally designed precertification initiative —
requiring taxpayers to submit relationship and residence
data during the summer months preceding the filing
season for the tax year about the likely course of events
for the whole year — raised many concerns and objec-
tions in the low-income clinic community. Those con-
cerns included the fact that taxpayers were being asked
to submit tax data at a time other than tax season, when
there was no tax preparation community (a seasonal
business) to help them; that the data (particularly regard-
ing relationships) could be difficult and time-consuming
to obtain;40 and that, in some cases, the submission date
to the IRS occurred before the data (that the child had
lived with the taxpayer for more than one-half of the
year) in fact was available. Also, the program as designed
provided no effective appeal rights from a denial of
precertification, because examination deficiency proce-
dures are based on a taxpayer’s actually claiming a
benefit on a return and it being disallowed. If a taxpayer
received a notice from the IRS before tax filing season
telling him that he was not entitled to claim the credit,
and accordingly he did do so, there would be nothing on
the return for the IRS to audit or any deficiency for the
Tax Court to adjudicate.
On June 30, 2003, the IRS published Ann. 2003-40,41
which described the precertification initiative, and re-
quested comments about the proposal from the tax
community. An avalanche of negative comments fol-
lowed.42 At the end of the comment period, the precerti-
fication program evolved into a certification program,
36In 1997 Congress authorized a five-year $716 million
appropriation to increase EITC audit activity as well as cus-
tomer service and education related to the credit. Although the
five-year period ended in 2002, Congress has continued to make
EITC-specific enforcement appropriations in the IRS budget




39Section 32(k)(2). To ‘‘recertify,’’ the taxpayer must attach
Form 8862, ‘‘Information to Claim Earned Income Tax Credit
After Disallowance’’ with proof of entitlement to the credit for
the current year. Although the IRS informs taxpayers, when the
credit is disallowed, that they must recertify for the credit using
Form 8862 if they wish to claim it again, it does not enclose the
form with the EITC disallowance letter. Failure to include the
Form 8862 with the tax return results in a math error disallow-
ance notice.
40Robert Greenstein, ‘‘The New Procedures for the Earned
Income Tax Credit,’’ Tax Notes, June 9, 2003, p. 1525.
412003-1 C.B. 1132, Doc 2003-14495, 2003 TNT 115-6 (June 30,
2003).
42See, e.g., ‘‘Professors Comment on EITC Precertification’’;
Doc 2003-18445, 2003 TNT 155-16 (Aug. 11, 2003) (Janet Sprag-
ens, Nancy Abramowitz, and Leslie Book); ‘‘Community Foun-
dation Opposes EITC Precertification,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 18, 2003,
p. 897 (San Francisco Foundation); Greenstein, ‘‘The New Pro-
cedures for the Earned Income Tax Credit,’’ Tax Notes, June 9,
2003, p. 1525 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities); Shinn,
‘‘Professor Comments on EITC Precertification,’’ Tax Notes, Sept.
8, 2003, p. 1264 (Marybeth Shinn, New York University); ‘‘H&R
Block Wants EITC Precertification Pilot Delyated,’’ Tax Notes,
Sept. 8, 2003, p. 1264; Henderson, ‘‘Civil Rights Coalition
Comments on EITC Precertification,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 8, 2003, p.
1265 (Wade Henderson, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights);
‘‘Group Finds EITC Plan Troublesome,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 8, 2003,
p. 1265 (Paula Roberts, Center for Law And Social Policy);
‘‘Religious Group Fears Impact of Precertification Program on
Current Success of EITC,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 8, 2003, p. 1265 (Mark
Pelavin, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism); ‘‘New
York City Council Objects to EITC Precertification Pilot Pro-
gram,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 25, 2003, p. 1011 (Gifford Miller, New
York City Council); ‘‘Professors Comment on EITC Precertifica-
tion,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 8, 2003, p. 1265; ‘‘Federation Opposes
EITC Precertification,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 18, 2003, p. 897 (Kerry
Korpi, American Federation of State County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO).
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involving asking taxpayers to mail the EITC supporting
data with the tax return for the year. Also, the require-
ment to precertify relationship was dropped.
In November 2003, the IRS announced that before it
would implement the certification program wholesale, it
would pilot-test certification on a random population of
25,000 (originally 45,000) taxpayers. The purpose of the
pilot was both to test the clarity of the IRS forms and to
determine if taxpayers could comply with the informa-
tion requests within the time allowed. In December 2003
the taxpayers in the pilot study (each of whom had
claimed the EITC with a qualifying child for the previous
year) were sent a letter asking them to submit documen-
tation, with their tax returns, that they had lived with a
qualifying child for more than one half of the year. They
were told that they would not be mailed their EITC
refunds until the documentation was accepted and they
were certified for the credit.
The pilot study informed taxpayers that they could
provide the residence information in one of three ways:
They could send in documents (for example, school or
doctor’s records) that showed that the qualifying child
lived with them for more than half the year; they could
send in letters on letterhead stationery from IRS-
approved officers stating the shared residency; or they
could obtain notarized affidavits from relatives, neigh-
bors, child-care providers, or others attesting to the
residency requirement.
The data from the pilot was evaluated by an outside
evaluator, Mathematica Policy Research Inc. Preliminary
results from the pilot indicated fewer taxpayers claiming
the EITC than in a control group of a second 25,000; fewer
taxpayers claiming qualifying children; and smaller
amounts of EITC claimed. What was not clear from the
results, however, was the extent to which the reduction in
EITC claims was due to weeding out ineligible claimants
and to what extent it resulted from a chilling effect on
claiming the credit by rightful claimants caused by the
certification requirement. Results of the data are being
further examined to determine answers to those ques-
tions.
In November 2004 the IRS initiated a second pilot,
recommended by Mathematica, to test the effects of
certification on a particular community and the institu-
tions of that community (for example, schools) to deter-
mine, for example, the effect on those institutions when
they were inundated with requests for data. The commu-
nity selected was Hartford, Conn., and about a third of
the EITC notices in the second pilot were sent to Hartford
residents. Hartford was chosen, according to the IRS,
because it shares demographic characteristics (race, gen-
der, patterns of EITC claims, geographic distribution of
EITC taxpayers, and infrastructure supporting low-
income taxpayers) with many other areas of the country
having high concentrations of EITC claimants. In the
second pilot, taxpayers were also asked to submit the
data ‘‘before April 15’’ rather than ‘‘with their returns,’’
because many in the prior survey had responded by
forwarding the information in advance of filing.
On November 29, 2004, the city of Hartford, together
with individual plaintiffs, filed a class action lawsuit in
federal district court in Connecticut, seeking injunctive
and declaratory judgment relief, to prevent the IRS from
pursuing the EITC pilot and from withholding refunds
until the targeted population sent in the requisite data.43
The suit alleged that the pilot was unconstitutional,
violated the equal protection and due process clauses,
and discriminated against African-Americans and His-
panics in violation of sections 1981, 1985, and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The suit alleged that the city
(as well as individual plaintiffs) would be harmed by
reason of the city’s having to incur additional costs for
housing, shelter, and food programs for persons eligible
to receive the EITC. There has been no outcome of the
lawsuit to date.
2. Continuing concerns about precertification. Despite
the changes to the original precertificiation proposal,
which have addressed some of the most egregious parts
of the proposal, we continue to have concerns about
certification. Those fall into several categories.
i. Effect on taxpayer burden and participation rates.
A principal concern, shared by many in the low-income
taxpayer community, as well as by many in the broader
pro bono and legal services communities, involves the
effect of certification on taxpayer burden and participa-
tion rates. More specifically, the concern is that a high
nonresponse or inadequate response rate to the initiative
within the allowed timeframes is likely, resulting in a
significant reduction in the number of eligible taxpayers
obtaining the credit.
Some important predictors for the certification process
are the problems low-income taxpayers have been expe-
riencing in the ‘‘regular’’ controversy resolution pro-
cesses under modernization (described earlier in this
report), as well as the dramatic findings of erroneously
denied credits in the national taxpayer advocate’s 2004
audit reconsideration study. The time allowed for provid-
ing certification information is short, and we have con-
cerns that many taxpayers faced with those challenges
will simply give up the credit or not follow up on a
‘‘failure to certify’’ letter based on a partial submission.
Also, the information required by certification can in
some cases be surprisingly difficult to obtain. For ex-
ample, fathers’ names (as opposed to mothers’) are often
not included on birth certificates or on school or medical
records. Many taxpayers who claim the credit change
residences often live in atypical, multigenerational
households to offset the high cost of housing. Their
names may not be on the lease or utility bills sent to the
residence. Some taxpayers use addresses other than their
own to permit their children to attend a better school.
Taxpayers with infant children who receive medical care
at emergency rooms or clinics may not be able to docu-
ment residence using school or medical records. Taxpay-
ers with foreign-born children may have difficulty ob-
taining birth certificates. And so on.
If the certification program is implemented, and up to
four million taxpayers per year are sent certification
requests to be processed during the filing season, it is
43‘‘Single Parents, City of Hartford File Complaint to Halt
EITC Test Program,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 6, 2004, p. 1362; Diana M.
Ramos et al. v. Treasury Department et al. The complaint is
available at Doc 2004-22805 or 2004 TNT 231-13.
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hard to imagine the IRS making many follow-up phone
calls or working with taxpayers to obtain the information
they need. Moreover, if certification is administered in a
manner similar to EITC audits by the campuses, many
deserving taxpayers may wind up without the credit
despite the IRS’s best efforts to operate the program
fairly.
ii. Appeal rights. A second concern involves taxpayer
rights to appeal a failure to be certified. Assume a
scenario in which the taxpayer fails to comply with the
certification request by either failing to submit any docu-
ments whatsoever or by submitting incomplete informa-
tion that is not, in the IRS’s view, sufficient for certifica-
tion. The tax return filed by the taxpayer for the year has
claimed the credit.
The IRS writes to the taxpayer, telling him that his
EITC refund for the year will be frozen pending receipt of
the certification information. The taxpayer can then send
in additional information — or not. But at some point, the
IRS must offer the taxpayer an opportunity to contest the
denial of the credit and must give the taxpayer a defi-
ciency notice to permit review of the issue by the Tax
Court. When and how will that occur?
A problem for the IRS is that certification is an audit of
the return, but only regarding one issue. Theoretically,
there may be other auditworthy issues on the taxpayer’s
return unrelated to the credit, such as, for example,
payment of self-employment tax, unreported gambling
income, or substantiation of charitable contributions or
automobile expenses. Section 7605(b) prohibits multiple
audits of a taxpayer’s return for the same year. Therefore,
if the deficiency notice is issued immediately, the IRS
may be surrendering its right to audit other issues by
focusing entirely on the credit. However, at some point,
taxpayers are entitled to contest their entitlement to the
credit in court and obtain their refund. Failure to allow a
timely contest may prolong receipt of a needed family
benefit.
Certification thus raises the possibility of either second
audits of the same year after a deficiency notice has been
quickly issued in connection with the claim of the EITC
or of delayed appeal rights of a denial of the credit until
the entire return can be examined. Neither is a good
result. And those are not the only process issues.
Assume a second scenario in which the taxpayer
submits the certification data exactly in the form required
by the IRS and is accordingly certified by return mail. The
taxpayer’s refund check is released and sent to the
taxpayer. But the taxpayer is in fact ineligible for the
credit because, although he lives with a qualifying child,
he is married and has filed as a head of household on his
tax return. (Section 32(d) requires that married taxpayers
claiming the credit must file joint returns.)
In that scenario, the problem is that certification is a
preaudit of the credit, but only regarding one of its
statutory requirements — the residency requirement.
Thus, in the above example, a certified taxpayer could
still later be found ineligible for the credit if she fails to
meet other statutory requirements, filing status being only
one. For example, a taxpayer at the end of the year could
be determined to be ineligible for the credit because his
income exceeded the statutory limits (section 32(b)), the
taxpayer earned excessive investment income for the
year (section (32(i)), or the taxpayer failed the relation-
ship test of the statute.
The IRS has said it is going to examine only the
residency requirement in the certification process, not
other requirements of the credit. Moreover, in the first
test study of certification, there were 700 ‘‘prefilers,’’ that
is, people who submitted the requested documentation
and were certified before they filed their returns.44 In
those cases, the IRS would have no information about
whether other credit statutory requirements were met.
In short, taxpayers who have gone through the certi-
fication process are likely to be confused and upset when,
despite having been certified, the IRS tells them their
credit has been denied and the refund check must be
repaid. Moreover, the issue also raises the second audit
problem under section 7605(b).
In still other scenarios, it is unclear how certification
will work when the taxpayer has a ‘‘tiebreaker’’ relation-
ship with another taxpayer who lives in the same house-
hold; for example, a grandmother and a parent who live
together with the child, both of whom may be eligible for
the credit with respect to the child. Under changes to the
tiebreaker rules enacted in 2001, the parent’s claim has
priority, so that the grandmother will be able to claim the
credit only if the parent does not claim it, which will not
be known without examining both returns. To be sure, if
the information is sent in with the individuals’ tax
returns, the IRS could address and rule on the tiebreaker
issue during the certification period based on computer
matches involving the Social Security number of the
qualifying child. But there is nothing to prevent the two
tiebreaker taxpayers from filing their returns at different
times during the filing season (one early; one late) or
during subsequent extension periods; and the IRS may
not know of a second potential claim of the credit
involving the same child until the first taxpayer has been
certified and the refund check has been mailed.
Those issues have not been adequately addressed by
the IRS, and the right answers are not necessarily clear.
iii. Disparate treatment. The most fundamental prob-
lem with certification is that it treats poor taxpayers
differently from other taxpayers. Overall, certification
puts a reporting and compliance burden on a targeted
taxpayer group that is far heavier than that imposed on
any other — a group that is least able to absorb it.
To be sure, the high error rate in the EITC requires IRS
attention if the IRS studies of overclaim rates are accu-
rate. Based on our own anecdotal evidence of EITC
audits described earlier in this article, however, as well as
the TAS audit reconsideration study of EITC audits in the
2004 National Taxpayer Advocate’s Report to the Con-
gress, there is some evidence that the IRS studies’ num-
bers are inflated by a high nonresponse rate and/or a
false high concession rate due to taxpayer inability to, or
fear of, navigating the tax controversy system. Indeed, in
2000 the advocate herself, then the director of a low-
income taxpayer clinic, stated that ‘‘as much as 25 percent
44Kenney, A. ‘‘Early Results of EITC Child Certification Pilot
Released,’’ Tax Notes, May 10, 2004, p. 633.
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of the EITC ‘error rate’ are people who are entitled to the
credit and simply fall out of the system because they
cannot respond to IRS notices in time, don’t have access
to phones, or can’t take time off work to get the required
documentation.’’45
But whether the EITC studies are accurate or not, the
differential enforcement strategies for low-income tax-
payers and others in the system is inappropriate. The
earned income tax credit is not the only area of tax law
with a high error rate. Yet, historically, the EITC has been
subject to more scrutiny than any other provision in the
code. In the 1990s there were three major IRS compliance
studies of the EITC (for tax years 1994, 1997, and 1999
returns) compared with no general compliance studies of
the rest of the taxpaying population since 1988 (the last
year the taxpayer compliance measurement program was
used). In the same time period that audits of EITC
claimants were ballooning, audit activity of other taxpay-
ers declined and in some cases almost disappeared.
Misclaims of the EITC subject the claimant to heavy
penalties and a complicated ‘‘recertification’’ procedure
to claim it in a future year. There are no comparable
penalties or reinstatement procedures for misclaimed tax
benefits, for any other taxpayers in the system, no matter
how large the error. Nor is there a preaudit requirement
for any other class of taxpayers.
With the certification initiative, the IRS continues to
differentiate the EITC, which it has repeatedly described
as a social welfare program embedded in the tax code
and therefore subject to special scrutiny. But however the
IRS describes it, the plain fact is that the EITC is a tax
provision that provides incentive benefits to a targeted
group of taxpayers, and is certainly not the only code
provision to do so.
To be sure, unlike other tax benefits, the EITC is
refundable and therefore involves the government actu-
ally writing checks to qualifying taxpayers. But from an
enforcement perspective, it is hard to see the difference
between $1 paid out erroneously and $1 that is not
collected from failure to audit an overstated claim on a
return. The effect on the fisc is the same, although the
class of taxpayers benefiting is not.
For all of the above reasons, we believe the certifica-
tion proposal should not be implemented.
V. Identity Theft
Identity theft is one of the most rapidly growing
crimes in the United States, with devastating conse-
quences to its victims. The FTC has stated that there are
almost 10 million identity thefts per year in the United
States, and the numbers are growing.46 Victims of iden-
tify theft receive bills for purchases they never made,
loan foreclosure notices for loans they never received,
and dunning notices from bill collectors threatening to
destroy their credit ratings. They can also receive tax bills
for income they never earned. Proving a negative is
always difficult, and those transactions are very compli-
cated and time-consuming to straighten out.
Identity theft can occur in a number of ways. A
taxpayer could have her wallet or purse stolen thereby
losing identifying information and a Social Security card.
Identifying information has also been fraudulently ob-
tained by cyber thieves, or through mistaken security
breaches by credit agencies.47 In addition to actual thefts,
taxpayers who are undocumented workers may make up
or ‘‘borrow’’ someone else’s Social Security number when
asked by an employer to fill out a W-4 form that is
required for employment. At the end of the year, those
numbers are then used by the employer in reporting the
employee’s income to the IRS and in providing a W-2
wage statement to the employee. When the true owner of
the Social Security number does not report the wages, she
will be issued a notice of unreported income by the IRS.
In the clinic, we have also seen false forms W-2 or 1099
intentionally fabricated by employers for former employ-
ees or unpopular relatives or acquaintances to create
additional deductions or to create trouble for a person
they didn’t like.
When the IRS receives an information report of in-
come and the computer fails to match it with reported
income on a return, the nonreporting taxpayer will get a
computer-generated math error notice stating that the
taxpayer owes a deficiency in tax. The taxpayer must
then convince the IRS (within the short time periods
allowed in math error cases) that he did not earn the
income and does not owe the additional tax, in the face of
a W-2 or 1099 to the contrary.
Proving a taxpayer’s identity, as well as the fact that
the W-2 or 1099 issued in the taxpayer’s name is errone-
ous, can require some very creative lawyering. Some-
times the taxpayer’s own validly issued W-2 and the
erroneous W-2 containing the taxpayer’s Social Security
number will have different names on them, suggesting
the identity theft. In other cases, the information reported
on the W-2s will be internally inconsistent, such as
reporting income from two full-time jobs in different
parts of the country.
If the taxpayer’s credit cards and Social Security card
were stolen, the taxpayer may have filed a police report
and may be able to obtain a copy of the report, may have
made reports to credit card companies cancelling the
stolen cards, and may have made requests to the Social
Security Administration for a substitute card. All provide
important evidence of the identity theft.
However, many never think to report those problems
to a government agency and may be unaware that a tax
issue exists until receipt of a preposterous tax bill. Also,
many LEP taxpayers may harbor a cultural reluctance to
engage in much governmental interaction.
Another sometimes successful line of attack we have
used has been to write to the pseudo-employers with an
45Stratton, S., H. Glenn, and R.J. Donmoyer, ‘‘EITC Rates Up;
Review Process Slows Down,’’ Tax Notes, Oct. 2, 2000, p. 28.
46Federal Trade Comm’n, Identity Theft Survey Report (Sep-
tember2003),http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.
pdf.
47Caroline E. Mayer, ‘‘Choicepoint Victims Have Work
Ahead,’’ The Washington Post, Feb. 23, 2005, at E01, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45534-2005Feb22.html.
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT





ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.





ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
enclosed picture and signature copy of the client and ask
them to verify (on letterhead stationery) that the taxpayer
never worked for them. The taxpayer may also have
reported the identity theft to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion.48 Those are all important pieces of proof to send to
the IRS (usually the of audit reconsideration office)
together with a personal statement explaining the situa-
tion.
In addition to straightening out the tax consequences
of the identity theft, it is important also to contact the
Social Security Administration to correct the taxpayer’s
earnings record.49
But even for taxpayers who use their best efforts to
straighten out an identity error, we have found that the
IRS is very reluctant to give up a claim of income when
it has an information statement (such as a W-2 or 1099) in
the taxpayer’s name. Moreover, when those identity
issues are combined with the accelerated processing of
cases in today’s modernized IRS, as well as the upcoming
privatization of debt collection, they raise many of the
same issues as described earlier in this report.
VI. Privatization of Debt Collection
The enforcement trends we described in the preceding
section, have serious implications for the IRS’s impend-
ing program involving outsourcing of debt collection that
was authorized by Congress in the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357). Commentators and others have
discussed many of the problems inherent in that pro-
gram,50 which include balancing taxpayer rights with tax
collection, controlling overreaching by the private debt
collectors whose income is directly tied to the revenue
produced, and ensuring taxpayer privacy regarding their
tax returns and return information. But it also seems
predictable that as the IRS moves forward with the
transfer of collections accounts to private debt collectors
— particularly if they are essentially ‘‘boiler rooms’’
located in foreign countries, have no understanding of
the controversy resolution processes, and are operating
solely through electronic means of communication —
that many low-income taxpayers and identity theft vic-
tims may find themselves caught in a crossfire as they
simultaneously try to deal with those collectors and
correct errors in their cases. It will be important to see
how the IRS and the debt collectors will distinguish
taxpayers with true debts from those who do not owe
additional tax but who have simply been denied process.
In particular, it will be important to see how audit
reconsideration will work in connection with privatiza-
tion.
VII. Suggestions for the Agency
It is clear that the changes brought about by modern-
ization are here to stay and that the IRS is not going to
turn back the clock. Recognizing that, we nonetheless
have several suggestions to improve the process for
low-income taxpayers:
1. Slow down the audit process, eliminate all combination
letters immediately, and allow a two-step examination/appeals
process in each case. For many low-income taxpayers, the
audit process has been collapsed from two-plus years
following the filing of the return, to less than nine
months, together with an audit cycle that for many
taxpayers allows insufficient time to collect information,
engage in a reasonable dialogue with the IRS, and reach
a fair resolution of the matter. We believe that sacrificing
several months of efficiency to inject an opportunity for a
more comprehensive evaluation of the taxpayer’s case is
a fair compromise between efficiency and process. To be
sure, this proposal will reduce the overall number of
cases handled annually by the IRS and the average case
cycle time, and it will require more enforcement re-
sources to be expended by the IRS. But it is not at all clear
whether the current audit procedures are saving the
agency money, because taxpayers are flooding into audit
reconsideration and other alternative processes within
the IRS, causing the agency to shift more resources to
those offices. Giving taxpayers a larger window of op-
portunity to have their cases correctly reviewed and
decided at the front end would reduce the need for, and
taxpayer reliance on, those backdoor offices. Moreover, it
would dramatically improve taxpayer morale and make
taxpayers feel that they have received a fair shake from
the system. That alone, in a self-assessment system, is a
reason to adopt this proposal.
2. Grant regular extensions of time to taxpayers for com-
plying with the IRS’s requests for information, and inform
taxpayers that they may request those extensions. This sug-
gestion also would prolong the case cycle time for the IRS
to review a taxpayer’s case, and it would also create
delays in evaluating the taxpayer’s information. How-
ever, it also appears to be a reasonable compromise
between efficiency and process. Much information in
EITC or other family status cases is difficult to obtain and
may require the taxpayer to take time off from work and
make special trips to schools, doctors’ offices, or govern-
ment record offices, as well as the post office all within 30
days. Moreover, it is one thing for the IRS to be tough on
extensions when the statute of limitations is about to run,
but it’s quite another when the statute of limitations
expires in two and a half years.
3. During the extended audit process, provide options to
taxpayers in every case for face-to-face or telephonic contacts
with IRS employees. Many low-income taxpayer audits
(EITC, dependency exemptions, filing status, child credit,
and so forth) involve the need to present family status
information, including complicated family relationships,
living patterns, children who move back and forth be-
tween relatives, and so forth. It is extremely helpful in
those cases if the taxpayer is given an opportunity to ‘‘tell
48Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse (Consumer Sentinel,
FederalTradeComm’n,Washington,DC),http://www.consumer.
gov/idtheft.
49Social Security Administration Publication No. 05-10064
(Feb. 2004).
50See, e.g., Catts, ‘‘House GOP Members Blast IRS Debt
Collection Privatization,’’ Tax Notes, Oct. 27, 2003, p. 459;
Hamilton, ‘‘The Fight Over the IRS Hiring Private Debt Collec-
tors,’’ Tax Notes, Oct. 20, 2003, p. 321; U.S. House Ways and
Means Committee, Hearing on IRS Use of Private Debt Collec-
tion Agencies, Doc 2003-12694, 2003 TNT 100-36 (May 13, 2003).
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his story’’ to the IRS and not just present documents.
Moreover, individual contact with an IRS officer gives the
IRS an opportunity to work with the taxpayer to com-
plete the audit in a manner agreeable to both sides and
gives the taxpayer a chance to ask questions.
4. Put a single person (whether or not remotely located
from the taxpayer) in charge of the taxpayer’s case when
multiple years are involved. Make sure the individual’s name
and phone number are prominently displayed on all correspon-
dence, as well as the hours that individual is available to take
calls from the taxpayer. It is hard to describe the number of
times our student-attorneys have called IRS representa-
tives who are looking into a second or third year in a
multiple-year audit of the taxpayer, only to find that that
person has had no contact with the person handling the
initial year of the audit, has no administrative file on the
case, has no knowledge of documents the taxpayer has
already given the IRS, and is working entirely from a
computer screen. The student-attorney is then required to
start entirely over again with the new person, even
though the issues in all years under review are the same.
That is inefficient for the IRS and is extremely frustrating
for taxpayers.
5. Improve the clarity of notices to taxpayers explaining in
bold and in short declarative sentences the tax year involved;
the IRS’s position regading the taxpayer’s return; and the
taxpayer’s options. Current communications are packed
with too much information, too small fonts, and unclear
descriptions of a taxpayer’s options. One of our academic
colleagues, at a conference for low-income taxpayer
clinics in December 2004 in Philadelphia, suggested the
IRS start using ‘‘Top Boxes’’ on its notices, that is, short
boxed information that succinctly described what the
notice is, such as (in bold type) ‘‘NOTICE OF DEFI-
CIENCY FOR TAX YEAR 2002’’ or ‘‘COLLECTIONS
NOTICE FOR TAX YEAR 2001.’’ In communicating with
his lawyer, the client could simply read the top box rather
than try to explain a recent communication from the IRS
that was received in the mail. We strongly support this
suggestion.
6. Reinstate Problem Solving Days.
7. Don’t close any more TACs.
8. Lobby Congress to repeal sections 32(k) and 6306.
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